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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 10

For Week Ending
27 May 1944

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B. ENEMY DISPOSITIONS IN THE WEST

The new army group in the TOULOUSE area is now confirmed as Army Group G controlling First and Nineteenth Armies.

No change is reported in the disposition of armoured divisions in the WEST. Recent activity in the areas of the three former Panzer Training Divisions continues, suggesting that the reorganisation of these divisions into Panzer divisions is progressing. Reports from the area believed occupied by 155 Panzer Training Division have recently made mention of 9 Panzer Division; it is therefore possible that the reconstitution of 155 has progressed sufficiently for the division to receive a new number. 9 Panzer Division, which suffered heavy losses in last winter's fighting in RUSSIA, is a suitable successor. That it may again have become operational is suggested by the as yet unconfirmed, but seemingly reliable, reports of the imminent move of 9 Panzer Division from the MARSEILLES area to ITALY.

The move of 21 Panzer Division to the area SOUTH of CAEN is confirmed by details of a rail movement from the RENNES area to FLERS, BAYEUX and CAEN. It is believed to extend as far EAST as the line LISIEUX - ARGENTAN. No further evidence has become available on the reported move of 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division from the THOUARS - POITIERS area. It remains in First Army area, although elements may have moved westwards towards the coast.

The unidentified division which arrived in the NANTES area at the beginning of May is now known to have been diverted, and to have finally detrained in the CHERBOURG Peninsula, detraining at VALOGNES, CARENTAN, LISON, PERLERS and STE SAUVEUR LE COMTE. The train movement was in two parts and of a size to suggest that perhaps an independent unit of non-divisional size may have accompanied the division.


It is now established that the conversion of 171 and 191 Infantry Training Divisions to Infantry divisions of field type has taken place. These follow the recently reported redesignation of 156 Infantry Training Division as 47 Infantry Division. The new numbering of 171 and 191 Infantry Training Divisions is not yet firmly linked with divisional numbers in the 40 series reported in the WEST, but they should logically represent 48 and 49 Infantry Divisions respectively.

Preparations for the arrival of an infantry division in the area AUCH - CONDOM - ESTANG are reported to have been made in mid-March. Subsequent reports of troop movements into this area suggest that it is now occupied by an infantry division in the process of formation. This addition increases the total in the WEST to 59 of which ten are Panzer type divisions, seventeen field (including the conversion of 171 Infantry Training Division not shown on the map), twenty-five lower establishment and seven training divisions.

C. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

On the Russian front there have been no developments which have altered the strategic aspect. The Germans continue to prepare for the expected Russian onslaught.

In ITALY, German strategy has been upset and the enemy must soon make up his mind to throw the HERMANN GOERING Division into the pot, for he has now committed all of his other mobile reserves and is still unable to stem our progress. Our attacks from the bridgehead must be stopped before we can cut across his NORTH to SOUTH communications or the enemy may find it impossible to extricate that part of Tenth Army on the western flank. KESSELRING has been slow to react to our offensive and, in his failure to appreciate the situation, has had to put his reserves in piecemeal. He has thus been unable to use these forces in their proper counter-attack role. Furthermore, the defensive layout of the long Italian coastline, so carefully planned,



has gone by the board. KESSELRING is in a difficult position. He has nothing more except HERMANN GOERING to call on that can fight offensively unless a division is moved from another theatre. There is evidence that the Panzer division in the SOUTH of FRANCE, now thought to be 9 Panzer, may be moving to ITALY. If this is so, then the Germans must consider the position in ITALY to be critical for at this stage the enemy can hardly relish sending divisions out of FRANCE, and to remove the only Panzer division in close support of the MEDITERRANEAN area away may call for some re-adjustment of the armour within FRANCE. 2 SS Panzer Division from TOULOUSE might be moved down or, though it is a more remote possibility, armour may be moved from Northern FRANCE. In any case, the loss of 9 Panzer Division (if it is going) to RUNDSTEDT points to the fact that even at this stage FRANCE does not have overriding strategic priority.

Other moves which have been taking place recently in the WEST continue to show the closing up of lay back divisions towards the beaches. This may be partly due to the interruption of railway communications by our bombing but it is also a pointer to an enemy determination to attempt to defend any invasion on the beaches.

D. ENEMY SUPPLIES AND TRANSPORTATION

1. ATTACKS ON RAIL TARGETS

The main events of the week have been:

- (a) Successful attacks by Bomber Command on TOURS, LE MANS and ORLEANS-les-AUBRAIS. These are on the important routes to the SOUTH of PARIS which the Germans have been using extensively since the bombing of the railway system NORTH of PARIS.
- (b) The attacks by Eighth Air Force on targets in Central and Eastern FRANCE. Most of these took place on 25 May. Results are not yet known.
- (c) The commencement of attacks by Fifteenth Air Force on railway targets in the SOUTH of FRANCE on 26 May - GRENOBLE, LYONS, NICE, ST. ETIENNE and CHAMBERY.
- (d) The resumption of attacks by fighter aircraft on locomotives. In view of the large amount of destruction to locomotive repair facilities which has recently been caused, damage to locomotives is far less easy to repair and the effects of a successful fighter attack are correspondingly more serious than before the inception of the bombing programme.

The effect of the attacks on the French railway system remains difficult to assess. A report has stated that on certain days French commercial traffic on the NORD system (on which the main weight of attack has fallen) was practically at a standstill. Certainly much re-routing and delay in this area has been caused both to French traffic and the German economic traffic, but there is no evidence that military troop trains have been prevented from running through the area or have been seriously delayed. The coal situation in PARIS remains serious and the Germans have agreed to send supplies from the SAAR.

2. RAILWAYS - FRANCE

The German authorities recently asked the SNCF to work out a new route between the SE and the SW. The reply was to be in German hands within three days. The Germans have for some time been worried about lateral communications in Southern FRANCE. In March, a specially heavy guard was put on the line MORCENX - MONT DE MARSAN - TARBES; in early April, a Railway Control Office was set up at TARBES. One of the main problems the Germans have to face in this area is that all the high

capacity lateral lines pass through TOULOUSE, the only recent alternative being as far NORTH as the line TOURS - VIERZON - SAINTCAITZE. No doubt Field Marshal BLASKOWITZ is worried about communication between his two Armies.

3. RAILWAYS - GERMANY

German propaganda has, in recent weeks, been running a campaign belittling the effectiveness of Allied air attacks on communications in Western EUROPE, and praising the effectiveness of the German repair organisation. Emphasis has been placed on the formation of trains of old wagons unfit for ordinary traffic purposes which are being kept filled with earth and of trains of wagons fitted with air brakes and capable of running at express speeds, which are being kept loaded with excavators and other contractors' plant. These trains are said to be stationed in various parts of Western EUROPE ready to be rushed to the scene of any attack. Other measures for which claims are being made include the bridging of craters with structures assembled from standard sections; the construction of temporary avoiding lines round heavily cratered areas on sleeper tracks; the provision of emergency signalling and train control arrangements; and the transfer to Western EUROPE of the Gulemeyer special road vehicles to permit of the transport of railway wagons by road; the number of these vehicles is very limited and each can only convey one railway wagon at a time, so that they will only make possible the movement of a strictly limited number of wagons containing highly urgent traffic, even if, as German propaganda implies, they work only short distances transferring railway wagons past closed sections of line such as a blocked yard or cut bridge. No information is available as to the number of special filling and equipment trains which have been set up, but neither of them is a new development, though it is probable that sheer necessity has caused their number to be increased considerably recently.

4. MILITARY TRANSPORT CONCENTRATIONS IN NW FRANCE

Recently two developments have occurred in NW FRANCE which affect military transport: the appearance of vehicle bays of military transport shelters, and the systematic requisitioning by the Germans of all privately-owned vehicles suitable for the transport of troops and supplies.

Air photographs reveal that a considerable number of military transport shelters have been constructed, most of them along hedgerows and at the side of main roads. They are normally in groups of 10 to 20, spaced at intervals of 30 feet or more.

Requisitioning of military transport is known to have occurred at several places (where horses and carts have also been taken). 1,200 lorries were said to have been taken from one department alone in February 1944. For the last four months, the local peasants have had to be prepared at any time to present themselves with their horses and carts, to undertake the transport of supplies, etc, for the German authorities. While it is probable that most of this requisitioned transport has been used to evacuate the civilian population from coastal areas and subsequently withdrawn to areas further inland, reserves of vehicles are likely to be held ready in all large towns to supplement the Army's deficiencies.

5. TRANSPORT

It may be reasonably anticipated that in the face of the intensified bomber offensive against railway targets in FRANCE, the enemy will seek to exploit to the full the transport resources of the French inland

waterways. How far he will be able to succeed in this design it is difficult to say. That the percentage of active craft currently averages 85 percent of the total number of barges in FRANCE suggests that the French fleet is already well extended. Since the beginning of the year, however, there has been a steady improvement in conditions for navigation and by now most of the damage sustained during the sabotage campaign in the latter part of last year has been repaired.

The only serious hold-ups at present are on the CANAL DU CENTRE, which is of minor importance, where sabotage of the locks at MONTCEAU-LES-MINES is impeding the export of coal from the local field, and on the ESCAUT (SCHELDT) at VALENCIENNES where the wreckage of the double-tracked railway bridge, destroyed by aircraft on 9 May, appears to have completely blocked the river to navigation.

It is as yet too early to observe whether any large scale diversion of the traffic from rail to inland waterway has occurred in FRANCE since the large scale bomber attacks on communications centres began. The only evidence which appears to bear on this is a movement of oil from STRASBOURG down the RHINE - RHONE CANAL to the dump in the FORET DE LA FERTE SOUTH of the CHALON-SUR-SAONE, reported to have begun on 28 April. No oil has been noticed passing along this waterway for a considerable time and it would seem that this constitutes a new development.

There are signs that intensive attacks on rail targets in Northern FRANCE and around PARIS have led to some diversion by more southerly routes of traffic bound for the WEST and SW. At the same time, they have added to the difficulties of operating in areas not directly affected by aggravating the already acute shortage of waggons.

It would not, therefore, be surprising if the enemy's decision to resort once more to the transport of oil by the RHINE - RHONE were partly inspired by a desire to relieve the hard-pressed French railway system.

6. SHORTAGE OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES IN GERMANY

Recent reports indicate that the scarcity of essential medical supplies for civilian purposes is now very severe in GERMANY. Sulpha drugs, ether, and alcohol are in very short supply, and aspirin is not obtainable at all. Doctors are vigorously discouraged from prescribing any kind of medicine for minor ailments, and no drugs of any sort can be purchased by the civilian population without a doctor's prescription.

This report, which is alleged to be based on practical experience relating to the end of 1943, suggests a somewhat more serious degree of shortage than we had previously believed to exist, though reports of shortages of all the items named have come to hand from time to time. The shortage of sulpha drugs is of interest and must be attributed to heavy demands of the armed forces.

E. ECONOMIC NOTES

The following is a summary of recent information regarding the situation in FRANCE:

1. ADMINISTRATION AND INVASION PRECAUTIONS

Instructions have been issued by LAVAL to the French Forces for the maintenance of order (including the recently mobilised Militia) in the event of an Allied landing.

These Forces have been divided into two groups, with separate functions. Firstly, the static elements (Police Civile, Brigades

Civiles and Gendarmerie) which will remain in the combat zones in order to ensure the maintenance and re-establishment of order, the protection of nerve centres and the functioning of public utility services; these forces will not take part in military operations. Secondly, the mobile forces (Mobile units of Gendarmerie, Garde Mobile, Police Mobile d'Etat, and the militia) who will be withdrawn outside the zone of military operations to maintain order in the rear. These forces are responsible for dealing with any Allied airborne troops landed in the rear, for the prevention of the mobilisation and putting into action of illegal resistance groups, and for the prevention of sabotage.

The French Militia, as was reported last week, is to be placed under the orders of the German military authorities, while all other forces, which will have had little military training, will be under the control of DARNAND, in his role as French Chief of Police.

DEAT, as Minister of Labour and National Solidarity, has given orders to the prefects of departments for the setting up of local committees of Coordination and National Solidarity. These committees are to have representatives of such orders as the Secours National, the Red Cross and the Workers' Committee for Immediate Relief, and are to cooperate with representatives of the public services in providing for the needs of the civil population.

There is further evidence to show that the Germans plan to round up all male civilians. It is said that all men must report to the authorities within twenty-four hours of an Allied landing and that any who fail to do so are liable to be shot.

Other reported plans include the temporary closure of shops and factories, the immobilisation of civilian traffic, and German supervision of gasworks and power stations.

There is no new information regarding the evacuation of coastal areas. The evacuation of women and children from PARIS continues.

2. THE FOOD SITUATION

The situation in PARIS has deteriorated. The prospect of a bread shortage which, with the denial of NORTH AFRICAN wheat supplies, is liable to occur during May-July, is made more serious by the breakdown in rail communications following the heavy Allied air attacks and by the shortage of fuel. For the latter reason, one-third of all bakeries in the SEINE department have been closed (1,340 small concerns being affected) and their production has been taken over by larger concerns. According to one report, the capital will be without bread by the end of the month unless fresh supplies can be obtained.

German plans for PARIS after an Allied landing are said to include the placing of 2,500 lorries at the disposal of the public services for the transport of foodstuffs. The Germans have also arranged for the replacement of these lorries by horse and hand-drawn carts if they are obliged to take back the lorries or cut their supplies of fuel.

Bread shortages in BRITTANY during February and March were also reported.

3. FUEL AND POWER

Industrial plans in the PARIS region have been severely affected for several months by the acute shortage of electric power. Distribution of hydro-power has been disrupted owing to bombardment and sabotage of intercommunication points on the grid. At the same time, damage

to rail and water communications in the NORTH by air attack and sabotage have made coal distribution inadequate and irregular. As a result of this transport situation the PARIS thermal stations have been unable to make up for the loss of imported current.

In PARIS, gas is available for only 5 1/2 hours a day, and authorised consumption figures must not be exceeded. The closing of over 1,300 bakeries in the SEINE Department, as reported above, was a further measure to save coal and gas.

Various measures have had to be taken to economise in the use of electricity, including cuts in the Metro train service and the closure of a number of stations, the closing of factories, including "Ru" and "S" factories, on certain days of the week, and prohibition of the use of lifts.

4. INDUSTRY

Current French industrial activity is for the most part limited to factories producing war material for the German Armed Forces. Many factories producing civilian consumer goods have been closed down both because of shortage of raw materials and shortage of labour.

As reported above, all factories will close temporarily when an Allied landing is made. Future policy will probably be dictated by events. The Germans will be reluctant to lose the French production of motor transport, components and spare parts for aircraft and motor transport, and many other valuable contributions, including electrical and optical precision apparatus. These factories will probably reopen fairly quickly unless the general internal situation gets out of hand.

Meanwhile, stocks of raw materials and valuable machinery are believed to have been evacuated from coastal areas, within a limit of 20 or 30 kms.

Plans for evacuation were made last September, when the regional heads of industrial production in coastal areas were instructed to take a census of stocks. Rubber stocks were to be moved first, followed by other raw materials, finished goods, and machinery. The evacuation of machinery was, at least initially, to be limited to valuable or easily moved machines.

Stocks and equipment in LE HAVRE, DIEPPE, CHERBOURG, BREST, LORIENT and other coastal towns further SOUTH were to be the first to be moved. It is not known to what extent this programme has been carried out.

5. PRICES AND COST OF LIVING

Living conditions in FRANCE today present a striking contrast as between the farming community and the town dwellers. The former have never been so well off, the latter perhaps never so badly.

As growers of their own food, the farmers are little concerned with rationing and much of their produce finds its way into the black market in the towns, where the prices obtained are often as much as eight times the official retail prices. These official prices are on the average about 150% above the pre-war level, the increase ranging from less than 20% in the case of bread to 200% in the case of butter and eggs.

Rations frequently are not honoured in full in the towns and in any case are so inadequate that they have to be supplemented by purchases in the black market. Often the poorer classes cannot afford to go to the black market and have therefore to make do on a very insufficient diet. It is much the same in the case of clothing, except that there is more equality of privation because the manufacturer and the merchant are under stricter supervision than the farmer.

F. POLITICAL NOTES

Nil.

G. MISCELLANEOUS1. GERMAN COMMANDERS IN THE WEST(a) No. 7 - GEYR von SCHWEPPEBURG

General LEO FREIHERR GEYR von SCHWEPPEBURG, who has been reported as commanding Panzer Gruppe WEST, was born at POTSDAM in 1886, son of the Master of the Horse to the King of WURTEMBERG. Throughout his long career with cavalry and tank troops he has devoted practically all his time, both on and off duty, to a study of these two arms.

On his record both staff and command appointments are well represented. From the 26 Dragoon Regiment, in which he was serving as a lieutenant in 1914, he was posted to the Staff College. During the war, SCHWEPPEBURG apparently performed mainly staff jobs, including divisional chief of staff, winning the Iron Cross, 1st Class, and a number of Bulgarian and Austro-Hungarian decorations.

Transferring to the Reichswehr, he served a short term as instructor at the infantry school at MUNICH. His subsequent transfer to a cavalry regiment was the first of a series of staff and command appointments in cavalry units and formations which ended in 1932 with command of a cavalry regiment.

In the following year he was appointed Military Attache to LONDON, BRUSSELS and the HAGUE, living in LONDON. Apparently his work was satisfactory for he was promoted Generalmajor within two years and held the Military Attache's post until 1937, when he was returned and given command of the 3 Panzer Division, which he led in the Polish campaign.

Late in 1940, after having received promotion to General der Kavallerie, he was appointed to command XXIV Panzer Corps, which performed well enough in the advance on KIEV to win the Ritterkreuz for its commander who was now referred to as General der Panzertruppen. During the winter of 1941-42, however, he is thought to have been ill, for it was from the commanders' pool that he was appointed to command XXXX Panzer Corps in SOUTH RUSSIA in late 1942. This was a short-lived job, however, and within 2½ months he was back in the commanders' post, possibly on the grounds of ill health. Little is known of his activities from this time until he emerged in August 1943 as Inspector of Armoured Troops in the WEST, a title which was later superseded by commander of "Panzer Gruppe WEST", although what change in functions this may have involved is not known.

The most persistent report of GEYR von SCHWEPPEBURG has to do with his capacity for hard, detailed work, which includes inspection of units "with the utmost thoroughness" and reading "everything dealing with mechanisation".

(b) No. 8 - CHRISTIANSEN

General der Flieger FRIEDRICH CHRISTIANSEN has had probably the most unique career among the higher commanders in the WEST. Born in WYK AUF FOHR, just off SCHLESWIGHOLSTEIN, his interests naturally lay in the Navy, and this is where he saw his World War service, which included a period in the Naval Air Force. After the war he is reported to have served in the German Merchant Navy for a little over 10 years, but even at this age his interest in flying was still strong, for in 1930 he is reported to have transferred to the commercial air service, and later he commanded the flying boat DO-X on its trip across the ATLANTIC.

By now CHRISTIANSEN was one of the leading figures in the development of German air activities, and in January 1934 he was appointed Chief of the Air Sport and Training section in the Air Ministry. In this job he eventually received the rank of General-major and became Generalleutnant and chief of the National Socialist Flying Corps in 1937.

In 1939 he achieved his present rank of General der Flieger and a year and a half later became commanding general in HOLLAND, but as a Wehrmacht rather than an Army or Luftwaffe commander.

His fairly rapid rise and present position may be due, in part at least, to his reported friendship with GOERING, although his record of successive and important administrative appointments indicate a fairly high degree of organisational ability.

2. NEWS FOR THE GERMAN TROOPS

The German soldier has shown himself a rather stubborn subject for propaganda treatment. He has undergone very thorough and explicit indoctrination in his civilian and military career, and he has been repeatedly and urgently warned about the alleged effects of Allied propaganda in the last war and its objects in this war. His education has left his critical faculty undeveloped and his capacity to appreciate any values except those of National Socialism limited. So, whatever may be the feelings and ideas of some of the better educated and more mature among the officers and NCOs and petty officers of the Wehrmacht, the mass of German fighting men appear to be immune from the appeal of the liberal ideals and political aspirations which played a leading part in the Allied propaganda of 1917 and 1918. Allied propaganda has, therefore, to be concentrated on the presentation of news.

In anything but the most impromptu and local propaganda, it seems necessary to observe the following rules: the source of written material must be concealed as far as possible; subversive or discouraging ideas must be suggested indirectly through facts and news; the reader must be encouraged to accept as true a large proportion of what he reads and be able to check the facts presented from his own experience.

The straightforward statement or exhortation from Allies to enemy does not fulfil all these conditions. But it has its place in psychological warfare because it presents avowed Allied policy in military and political matters which sooner or later affect the individual German fighting man. Official communiques, definitions of Allied political intentions, policy towards prisoners, attitude towards war criminals all play a vital part in the attack on the fighting spirit of the enemy. But they do not supply the critical, pessimistic and detached German point of view which is lacking in the German press and wireless programme.

To present such a point of view in accordance with the propaganda principles mentioned above is the object of a daily newssheet that is now being dropped from the air on German troops in the WEST. The language, presentation, make-up and choice of news in Nachrichten für die Truppe are calculated to give, so far as possible, the illusion of German origin. The tone and attitude of mind expressed are critical. The front page covers the course of military operations on all fronts day by day, concentrating on that news which confirms the worst anxieties of the average German: weakness in the air, the strain on the Eastern front, the failure of the U-boats, the tendency of the High Command to order costly and - on a long view - fruitless delaying actions. The back page presents news from home of a provocative and depressing kind: lists of streets damaged in Allied air raids; a diary of war news in the last three weeks; stories of hardship, corruption, war-weariness and Party privilege which the

reader can confirm from his own experience; sport news of general interest; small news items from home which reflect the strain and hopelessness of the war situation.

This newsheet may be regarded as several psychological warfare leaflets rolled into one and presenting a concentrated view of the war. Its character is such that it can be used for tactical purposes against individual formations of enemy troops. The situation, both tactical and strategical, on their flanks and rear can be presented in a way likely to influence the ordinary soldier's view of the action in which he is already engaged or will be later engaged. If this presentation is correct in topographical detail and - as far as security allows - in military detail, he cannot disregard its implications.

It is disturbing for the German soldier fighting in the WEST to learn that things are going badly for GERMANY on the Eastern front, on the Italian front, in the air over GERMANY. He cannot dismiss the fear that the High Command may regard the Eastern front as more important than the Western front, the defence of German airfields and aircraft factories as more important than the defence of the big cities and towns or the provision of air cover for the troops. If he can be given the right day to day picture of the whole war, the importance of his particular front fades.

This newspaper is already being dropped daily on German troop concentrations in all occupied countries of Western EUROPE. It is dropped by leaflet bomb, each bomb containing some 25,000 copies. By the use of the bomb instead of the package it is possible to pin-point targets with fair accuracy.

When operations begin in the WEST dropping will be more concentrated and intensive.

Owing to the nature of the military material used in this newsheet, its production and distribution are classified as secret operations. The possibility must not be overlooked that this newspaper may be regarded by German soldiers deserting or surrendering as equivalent to an Allied leaflet.