TOP SECRET

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological War fare Division

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COPY NO 1

25th May, 1944.

(This guidance is valid for the first four days of the operation. It will be supplemented as required.)

I. BACKGROUND BRIEFING FOR PROPAGANDA AGENCIES. (Not to be used in output.)

A. Military.

1. Initial Composition of Forces.

(a) Not only Anglo-U.S. troops but also other Allied troops will participate, including: French airborne troops. Later, additional French forces will be landing and taking up their duties.

(b) Allied naval and air forces will carry, maintain and protect the operation.

2. Synchronisation with other Offensives.

(a) There will be synchronised, but not necessarily simultaneous, offensives on (i) the Russian front, (ii) in the Balkans by Tito, (iii) in Italy, (iv) and in the air war over Germany - unless air needs over the beachheads interfere.

(b) It will be the first of a series of West European operations aimed at targets ranging from Trondheim to Bordeaux in the north and Civitavecchia to Perpignan in the Mediterranean.

3. Likely German Strategy and Resources.

(a) German resistance will be fanatically determined, and they will be employing all their available resources. Rommel's main assignment for the past four months has been to strengthen the Atlantic Wall, and for some time German propaganda has taken the line that ultimate victory goes to the army which not only has the arms but also deserves victory because of its morale.

(b) Under Rundstedt, Rommel, along with Blaskowitz, will be in charge of operations. We can expect that Rommel will throw forward all the men at his disposal so as to crush the landings on the beachheads themselves, or the immediate vicinity, as soon as possible.

(c) The Germans will have initial superiority in supply facilities and with the use of these may well be able in twenty-four hours to concentrate *numerical superiority*. *In the early* stages these superiorities may be substantial. Against these we shall have (i) marked air superiority, (ii) naval supremacy, (iii) limited strategical initiative and tactical surprise; the Germans do not know how many more landings there will be and this will immobilize their distant reserves.

Authority NWE-Eisenhower Coll. 4-B
Date 7/5/72
By DJH NARS Date 4/12/73

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4. First Phase - Capture and Consolidation of the Bridgehead.

We should assume, in preparing propaganda, two possible critical moments during the first phase - (i) the first few hours on the bridgehead, and, (ii) the first few days when we are seeking to enlarge and consolidate the bridgehead. This first phase may well last four days.

5. Second Phase.

After the bridgehead is established the next critical time will be that of the German counter-attack. This phase may well last for a fortnight.

B. Wehrmacht.

(a) The morale of the German battle troops should be assumed good. This will not apply to the Polish and Russian (largely Georgian) units, although there is a considerable risk that the latter will fight well.

(b) Nervousness and tension will probably be high among the inactive flanking troops and flanking services, who at the beginning will be awaiting attack on themselves.

(c) Appreciable numbers of non-Germans in the German Labour Organization and Todt Organization will be in the vicinity.

C. Local Population.

(a) The civilian population in the areas concerned is far below its normal strength - most of the residents will be women, children and old men. They will be instructed by radio and leaflets to stay put. We cannot assume, however, that these initial instructions will be obeyed or that they will be able to obey them.

(b) Organized professional resistance groups have received their instructions from the appropriate authorities to make a maximum effort from the moment of landing.

II. GUIDANCE.

A. General Considerations.

1. In handling the news bearing upon the operation it will be necessary to maintain a balance between

(a) our complete confidence in the outcome of the operation

(b) our recognition of the difficulties and hazards of the greatest amphibious operation ever staged against massive defences.

2. A further parallel difficulty exists in reconciling the scale of the forces involved with the magnitude of the still greater issues at stake.

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B. Overall Guidance.

Do's.

(a) Call our armies the "Allied Expeditionary Force", not "the Armies of Liberation".

(b) Emphasize integrated action by all three Services.

(c) Maintain by related reporting, the balance between this front and all others, showing synchronised action by the United Nations on all Fronts.

(d) Stress the increased vulnerability to further landings of the rest of Northwest Europe and the Mediterranean coast.

(e) Point out that progress of our forces must be judged not in terms of miles but of defence lines broken and enemy killed. It will be achieved against German troops whose defences, numbers, material and, above all, morale, are good - as good as any available to the German High Command.

(f) Comment that progress achieved is the result of (i) our superior morale, (ii) our superior tactics - especially in terms of flanking and encircling movements, (iii) our preceding air attacks on German means of communication and supply throughout occupied Europe, (iv) the assistance of organized professional resistance and of transport workers, (v) our strategical and tactical superiority on the sea and in the air.

Don't's.

(a) Don't claim that the maximum German naval effort to defeat the operation has been made and overcome; their maximum effort may come at a later stage. Don't ask what has happened to the German surface fleet.

(b) Do not call the operation the "invasion" or "the Second Front".

(c) No suggestion of the use of "Secret Weapons" by either side unless it is covered by official United Nations release.

(d) No suggestion or implication that this is the only landing taking place or contemplated in North-western Europe.

(e) No mention of the nationality and comparative strength of the troops engaged until an official release.

(f) No naming of, or speculation about the identity of, the commanders of naval, air and land forces, except those announced officially.

(g) No speculation as to rate of progress or future objectives.

(h) Don't state or imply that victory on the beachheads means an early end of the war.

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(i) No reports or discussions about food and relief supplies should be given unless based on official releases.

C. Special Guidance for Propaganda to the Enemy.

(a) Do not waste radio time on the German troops in the battle area. They will not be listening.

(b) Concentrate on explaining to the German people as a whole, and in particular to the German troops on the flanks, the plight of the forward and flanking troops left behind like "human land mines" to be "winkled out". Draw parallel from Cassino and the Mütler line.

(c) A special directive will follow for propaganda to foreigners in the German army.

(d) Air attacks on Germany should, wherever possible, be linked with the shortage of German fighters - particularly night fighters - over Germany. Due to their concentration in the western occupied territories.

(e) Exploit the tension of German troops standing to along the whole length of the Atlantic Wall.

(f) Generally in handling the news avoid melodrama. The treatment should be soldierly, sober, matter of fact.

(g) Stress the tremendous fire-power which will be needed to breach the Atlantic Wall, emphasizing the effects of our naval gunfire, the heaviest yet experienced by German troops. Play up hard news of the effects of our fire-power on sea and land.

D. Special Guidance for Propaganda to Western Occupied Countries.

(a) Maintain constant appeal for restraint and discipline. Those should follow strictly the lines of Supreme Commander's statement. In particular, follow the Supreme Commander's lead in doing all you can to discourage a levee en masse in this phase. The Supreme Commander will be supported in this line by statements from King Haakon, the Dutch Prime Minister and M. Pierlot. It is still uncertain whether General de Gaulle will speak, and if he speaks, what he will say.

(b) London radio will give the line for a special campaign to encourage transport workers to organize sabotage of communications feeding the Atlantic Wall between Antwerp and Nantes. This line will be given by British and American speakers and also by Guigud in a special appeal to members of the French trades Union, CGT. This line must be strictly followed and no appeals made to transport workers outside the above area. Cross reporting in various language broadcasts is permitted.

(c) News of successful action by transport workers should be fully reported and related where possible to our air campaign against German communications. Contrariwise, news suggesting levee en masse should be played down.

(d) Achievements of organized resistance groups in France should be treated solely as part of military operations and not as prelude to levee en masse.

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