

**SECRET**  
(EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET)

**"BIGOT"**

**SECRET - OFFICERS ONLY**

**B I G O T**

**MINUTES OF SUPREME COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE**

**Room 105, Norfolk House**

**1500 hrs, 21 January 1944**

**MEETING NO. 2**



**Present:**

General D. D. EISENHOWER  
Air Chief Marshal Sir A. TEDDER  
Admiral Sir B. H. RAMSAY  
General Sir B. L. MONTGOMERY  
Air Chief Marshal Sir T. LEIGH-MALLORY  
Lt. Gen. F. E. MORGAN  
Major General W. B. SMITH  
Air Commodore S. C. STRAFFORD  
Brigadier K. G. McLEAN  
Captain M. J. MANSEERGH  
Colonel GILMER

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Authority

By ARK

Guidelines for Com. Hdqrs. 7/5/72

NLE DATE 10/25/73

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1. The OVERLORD and ANVIL operations were discussed in detail. It was decided that a cablegram should be prepared by Plans, submitted to the Chief of Staff, SAC, for additions and then submitted to the Supreme Commander for final approval. It was concluded that the telegram should include a positive statement that OVERLORD must have in the initial assault five divisions landed simultaneously; that this decision should be supported by the following facts:

a. That the present plan of attack was in too much of a column.

b. That additional width of the front would be necessary.

c. That it is absolutely necessary to secure port facilities quickly.

d. That it is necessary to seize the tactical advantage from the Germans at the earliest possible time.

e. That it was desirable to get behind the barrier on the GOUTENTIN Peninsula by a large and strong force.

2. It was proposed that this draft telegram be prepared as a "bill" to the Combined Chiefs of Staff listing requirements in order that they could see the picture as it was actually seen by the Commanders-in-Chief at this time. This cablegram was to include a strong statement to the effect that the success of the OVERLORD operation was the crisis of the European war both for the U.S. Government and the British Government; that it must not fail but must be a complete success.

3. It was stated by Admiral Ramsay that it was absolutely essential that all landing craft be available to him for training at the latest, D-28, in order that essential training could be completed prior to D-Day. It was decided that the message should include a statement that the target date might possibly be delayed until late May or early June, depending upon the time that necessary landing craft could be made available to the Supreme Commander by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. The Supreme Commander desired that this cablegram not minimize ANVIL as he felt that ANVIL would have a great political and psychological effect upon the European war.

5. General Montgomery discussed the subject of cover plans for this operation. It was agreed that the cover plan for this operation would be handled by GOSSAC Headquarters on a high level.

6. The location of GOSSAC Headquarters was discussed. It was decided that the subject would be examined by Signals with the view to recommending to the Supreme Commander the final location of GOSSAC Headquarters, prior to its move to the Continent of Europe.

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7. The Supreme Commander discussed briefly the subject and the necessity of forming an experimental and research subsection in the GOSSAC Headquarters, which could coordinate the research and experiments made by the several services. He expressed a desire that every invention and experiment be gone into thoroughly in order that we could get the most advantages from them.



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