

# SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 AND 5.—OCTOBER TERM, 1954.

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|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Oliver Brown, et al., Appellants,<br>1<br>v.<br>Board of Education of Topeka,<br>Shawnee County, Kansas,<br>et al.         | On Appeal From the<br>United States Dis-<br>trict Court for the<br>District of Kansas.                          |
| Harry Briggs, Jr., et al.,<br>Appellants,<br>2<br>v.<br>R. W. Elliott, et al.                                              | On Appeal From the<br>United States Dis-<br>trict Court for the<br>Eastern District of<br>South Carolina.       |
| Dorothy E. Davis, et al.,<br>Appellants,<br>3<br>v.<br>County School Board of Prince<br>Edward County, Virginia, et<br>al. | On Appeal From the<br>United States Dis-<br>trict Court for the<br>Eastern District of<br>Virginia.             |
| Spottswood Thomas Bolling, et<br>al., Petitioners,<br>4<br>v.<br>C. Melvin Sharpe, et al.                                  | On Writ of Certiorari<br>to the United States<br>Court of Appeals for<br>the District of Co-<br>lumbia Circuit. |
| Francis B. Gebhart, et al., Peti-<br>tioners,<br>5<br>v.<br>Ethel Louise Belton, et al.                                    | On Writ of Certiorari<br>to the Supreme Court<br>of Delaware.                                                   |



[May 31, 1955.]

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

These cases were decided on May 17, 1954. The opinions of that date,<sup>1</sup> declaring the fundamental principle

<sup>1</sup> 347 U. S. 483; 347 U. S. 497.

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that racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional, are incorporated herein by reference. All provisions of federal, state, or local law requiring or permitting such discrimination must yield to this principle. There remains for consideration the manner in which relief is to be accorded.

Because these cases arose under different local conditions and their disposition will involve a variety of local problems, we requested further argument on the question of relief.<sup>2</sup> In view of the nationwide importance of the decision, we invited the Attorney General of the United States and the Attorneys General of all states requiring or permitting racial discrimination in public education to present their views on that question. The parties, the United States, and the States of Florida, North Carolina, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Maryland, and Texas filed briefs and participated in the oral argument.



<sup>2</sup> Further argument was requested on the following questions, 347 U. S. 483, 495-496, n. 13, previously propounded by the Court:

"4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates the Fourteenth Amendment

"(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the limits set by normal geographic school districting, Negro children should forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice, or

"(b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an effective gradual adjustment to be brought about from existing segregated systems to a system not based on color distinctions?

"5. On the assumption on which questions 4 (a) and (b) are based, and assuming further that this Court will exercise its equity powers to the end described in question 4 (b),

"(a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these cases;

"(b) if so, what specific issues should the decrees reach;

"(c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear evidence with a view to recommending specific terms for such decrees;

"(d) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance with directions to frame decrees in these cases, and if so, what general directions should the decrees of this Court include and what procedures should the courts of first instance follow in arriving at the specific terms of more detailed decrees?"

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These presentations were informative and helpful to the Court in its consideration of the complexities arising from the transition to a system of public education freed of racial discrimination. The presentations also demonstrated that substantial steps to eliminate racial discrimination in public schools have already been taken, not only in some of the communities in which these cases arose, but in some of the states appearing as *amici curiae*, and in other states as well. Substantial progress has been made in the District of Columbia and in the communities in Kansas and Delaware involved in this litigation. The defendants in the cases coming to us from South Carolina and Virginia are awaiting the decision of this Court concerning relief.

Full implementation of these constitutional principles may require solution of varied local school problems. School authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems; courts will have to consider whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional principles. Because of their proximity to local conditions and the possible need for further hearings, the courts which originally heard these cases can best perform this judicial appraisal. Accordingly, we believe it appropriate to remand the cases to those courts.<sup>3</sup>

In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies<sup>4</sup> and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs.<sup>5</sup> These cases call

<sup>3</sup> The cases coming to us from Kansas, South Carolina, and Virginia were originally heard by three-judge District Courts convened under 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281 and 2284. These cases will accordingly be remanded to those three-judge courts. See *Briggs v. Elliott*, 342 U. S. 350.

<sup>4</sup> See *Alexander v. Hillman*, 296 U. S. 222, 239.

<sup>5</sup> See *Hecht Co. v. Bowles*, 321 U. S. 321, 329-330.

