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1ST MAY, 1944

WAR CABINET

JOINT PLANNING STAFF

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 By: ~~ALALA~~  
 By: ~~ALALA~~  
 Date: ~~1944~~

RUSSIAN CO-OPERATION IN PLAN "BODYGUARD"

Report by the Joint Planning Staff

In anticipation of the instructions of the Chiefs of Staff we have examined a telegram from General Burrows to D.M.I. and submit the following report.

SCS - SHAEF File 11  
 339  
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2. From the strategic point of view we can see no objection to the Russian proposal to make raids on the coast of Northern Norway or Northern Finland. Such operations cannot clash with any plans made so far for the actual employment of our own forces. The only strategic interest which we have in this area is in connection with plan BODYGUARD, which includes an attempt to convince the enemy that an operation will be carried out against Scandinavia.

3. We have consulted the London Controlling Officer and have confirmed that the suggested raids by the Russians would be of great value to him in implementing plan BODYGUARD. The general effect of the Russian proposals will undoubtedly be to contain German forces in Norway who might otherwise be withdrawn to repel the OVERLORD assault.

4. Such raids will probably cause uneasiness to the Norwegians who are naturally anxious that the Russians should gain no permanent footing in their country, and also to the Swedes who, however, are in any case already thoroughly alarmed. We have consulted the Foreign Office and their view is that even if it were possible to object to the Russians landing on Norwegian soil it would not be worthwhile to do so. They do not consider that the Russians intend, at this stage at any rate, to acquire a permanent footing in Norway and that therefore any objections from the Norwegian Government's point of view should be overruled. The Foreign Office consider, however, that H.M. Ambassador at Moscow should be instructed to suggest to M. Molotov that he should summon the Norwegian Ambassador to the Soviet Union at whatever time is thought opportune by the Soviet High Command, and assure him that the Soviet Government have no intention whatsoever of permanently occupying any Norwegian territory.

\* MIL 1179 dated 28th April.

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**TOP SECRET**

5. In view of the fact that this is the first occasion on which the Russians have asked us for help in implementing a plan which is of mutual advantage to them and to ourselves, we consider that the opportunity should certainly be taken to show our appreciation of their help. Since also they are intent on acting with impressive speed we suggest that no time should be lost in giving them all the help which we can afford and which is summarised at Annex.

6. Accordingly we recommend that:-

(a) The War Office should be invited to send a suitable cable to General Burrows

(i) including a statement welcoming the Russian proposals for these raids in Northern Norway or Northern Finland;

(ii) giving all possible information;

(iii) stating that, if necessary, an officer will be sent by air to Moscow with additional information, including air photographs, providing the Soviet Government agrees to an aircraft landing there.

(b) The Air Ministry should be invited to select a suitable officer and provide an aircraft to fly to Moscow, should this be necessary.

(Signed) G. GRANTHAM  
C. S. SUDEN  
J. L. DAWSON

Offices of the War Cabinet,  
S.W.1.

18T MAY, 1944.

ANNEX

INFORMATION ON NORWAY AND FINLAND

From General Burrows' telegram\* it would appear that the reason for selecting "about a dozen most suitable places" was to ensure that the operational intelligence could be despatched by air. In fact, it is possible to supply the information set out below, covering the whole area, in sufficiently small bulk to be carried in a Mosquito.

2. A selection of areas has not been made, as the intelligence is comprehensive and there is no indication of the scope of the intended Russian operations.

3. The following intelligence can be made available by Tuesday 2nd May. A large proportion of it has been obtained from Norwegian sources.

- (a) Map of scale one in a million showing the main coastal batteries.
- (b) Map of scale 1/100,000 showing all coast defences from NARVIK to PETSAMO, corrected up to 30th April, 1944.
- (c) Air photographs of all areas covered by British P.R. to date.
- (d) Air photograph interpretation report dated February 1943.
- (e) Airfield map, corrected to date.
- (f) Admiralty charts of area under review, corrected to date.
- (g) Coast report giving beaches and landing places, dated December 1941. (About 3 months would be required to bring this publication completely up to date, but any amendments would be of comparatively minor importance).
- (h) Report on the communications dated December 1941. (The same applies to this publication as to the one on the coast).
- (i) Report on the communications in the northern part of the area, dated November 1943.

4. No raids have been carried out by British forces on this part of the coast of SCANDINAVIA, but attached\* is an outline of three operations planned by C.O.H.Q. and a list of other possible objectives.

5. Although not a target for seaborne operations it is considered that one of the most important strategic areas is that which includes the KOLOSJOKI nickel mines and the power plant at JANISKOSKI.

\* MIL 1179 dated 28 April 1944.  
\* Appendix A.

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APPENDIX A.

1. The following raiding operations have been under consideration at O.C.N.C.

- (a) An attack by parachute troops on the NORDALS Viaduct and on the NARVIK railway about 4 miles from the Swedish frontier. This operation visualised a force of 50 - 70 men and was fully mounted but did not take place owing to adverse weather and was finally cancelled in the early part of 1943.
- (b) An attack by a small force of ski troops on the torpedo store at BAKK airfield. This operation involved a landing by submarine or surface craft at a point near HANNESTAD, the party being intended to be landed by rubber boat and then to proceed to BAKK on skis. This operation was fully mounted and a force ready to sail in the early part of 1943 but was cancelled since the believed capture by the enemy of a Norwegian agent was feared to have compromised the plan.
- (c) An attack by Norwegian troops on the KOLOSJOKI nickel mines and/or their principal power plant at JANISKOSKI, both south west of PETCANO and at a distance of approximately 30 and 50 miles respectively. This operation would have involved the use of not less than one battalion of parachute troops in view of the considerable enemy opposition anticipated, and would have required the force operating from a Russian base in the MURANISK area because of the very great distances of the targets from U.K. bases.

2. Other Possible Target Areas.

- (a) TROSO - Naval and seaplane base, administrative offices, Gestapo headquarters; a large scale raid would be necessary.
- (b) HARSTAD - In a somewhat similar category but considerably less important and less formidable as a target.
- (c) BADDERAIDET - German concentration camps, both KVAMNINGS located west of ALTA. These concentration camps previously housed in the region of 1,000 political prisoners, mostly Norwegian patriots. It is not known if they are now occupied by prisoners.
- (d) HAMMERFEST - In a similar category to HARSTAD.
- (e) SKJOMENFJORD - German naval base about 10 miles S.W. of NARVIK.
- (f) ALTENFJORD - German naval base.
- (g) Vulnerable points on the main trunk road from NARVIK to KIRKENES. These are detailed in the communications reports.

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