

Description: This memo outlined Operation Bodyguard.
From: Robert E. Baker
To: General Wlaer Bedell Smith, General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff at SHAEF
Date on document: February 3, 1944

Location: Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library
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The main Allied effort in Spring 1944 should be against the Balkans Operations in Italy would be continued, augmented by amphibious operations.

3. In regard to Allied strength and dispositions, we should induce the enemy to believe the following:

- Shortage of manpower has obliged cannibalisation within the British Army in UK;
- Number of divisions in UK is less than is in fact the case;
- Personnel of certain allied divisions in Mediterranean are being relieved by fresh divisions from U.S.;
- Shortage of landing craft exists until Summer, 1944;
- Forces in Mediterranean are greater than is, in fact, the case;
- French forces are taking over responsibility for defense of North Africa, relieving Anglo-American forces for Spring operations elsewhere;
- British divisions and craft are being transferred from India to Middle East;
- Fresh divisions from U.S. are expected to arrive in Mediterranean.

4. Means of implementation of plan "BODYGUARD" include movement of forces, camouflage devices, W/T deception, diplomatic approaches to Sweden and Turkey, leakage and rumours, and political warfare.

S-SHAEF File No. 38 / Bodyguard

Robert E. Baker
ROBERT E. BAKER,
Major, G.S.C.,
Asst. Sec. General Staff.

33-1110
Which staff section is acting on this?
W. K. P.
GENERAL G-3 (OPS-B) COX
JERVIS-READ IS HANDLING

Noted
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5/2/44

Supreme Headquarters
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Secretary General Staff

3 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff.

Subject: Precise of Plan "BODYGUARD"

1. Plan "BODYGUARD" is an overall deception policy for the war against Germany, approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (TAB A). Its object is to induce the enemy to make faulty strategic dispositions in relation to operations by the United Nations against Germany.

2. This overall deception policy is presented to induce the enemy to believe that the allied plan for 1944 is as follows:

Long range bomber reinforcement is delaying ground forces build-up; An attack on Northern Norway with Russia is to be concerted in the Spring;

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Asst. Sec. General Staff.

33 1110
Which staff section is dealing on this part of this?
W. K. P.
GENERAL
G-3 (OPS-B) COX
JERVIS-READ 15
HANDLING

Noted
mm
5/2/44

SGS-SHAEF File No. 38 / Bodyguard

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