Otto Skorzeny Describes the Planning and Failure of Operation Greif During the Battle of the Bulge (1945)

Date: August 12, 1945

Created By: Interrogator was R.E. Merriam

Original or Replica: Original

Era: The General, The Ardennes Offensive

Collection: Eisenhower Presidential Library

Citations: Walter Bedell Smith Collection of World War II Documents, Box 41, Interviews with High-Ranking German Officers (3); NAID #12130741

This August 12, 1945 U.S. Army interview with captured German SS officer Otto Skorzeny examines his role in Operation Greif, the special German operation conducted during the Battle of the Bulge. Skorzeny explains that Adolf Hitler personally summoned him in October 1944 and ordered him to organize a force that would operate behind American lines during the planned Ardennes offensive. The mission was intended to help German forces reach and seize bridges over the Meuse River, with Skorzeny initially given only a few weeks to organize and train his men.

Skorzeny describes organizing his force into two major elements: small commando teams and the larger 150th Panzer Brigade. The commandos included English-speaking German soldiers equipped with American uniforms and vehicles. Their missions included reconnaissance, destroying bridges and communications, removing or reversing road signs, spreading false information, and creating confusion behind American lines. The 150th Panzer Brigade, meanwhile, was intended to imitate an American armored formation and exploit breakthroughs created by the main German offensive.

According to Skorzeny, the operation quickly encountered serious problems. German forces failed to achieve the rapid breakthrough necessary for his brigade to penetrate American lines, forcing the unit to fight instead as a conventional combat formation. Some commando teams nevertheless successfully infiltrated American positions, reporting troop movements, abandoned airfields, ammunition dumps, and other intelligence. Skorzeny states that 44 men crossed American lines and eight failed to return.

The interview also addresses the brigade’s heavy fighting around Malmedy, where Skorzeny reports losses approaching 35 percent of the unit’s strength. Significantly, he denies that his force had orders to capture high-ranking Allied officers and explains that German soldiers wearing American uniforms were instructed to remove them before entering combat.

The document provides a valuable postwar account from one of Operation Greif’s principal commanders, revealing the ambitious plan to infiltrate and confuse American forces as well as the logistical problems and battlefield setbacks that prevented the operation from achieving its original objectives.