CIA Tests U-2 Vulnerability to Soviet Fighters While Identifying Priority ICBM Reconnaissance Targets (1959)

Date: April 1959

Created By: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency

Original or Replica: Original

Era: The Cold War, The Presidency

Collection: Eisenhower Presidential Library

Citations: Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 15, Intelligence Matters (9); NAID #12009242

This collection of top-secret CIA documents from March and April 1959 examines two closely connected issues facing the U.S. intelligence community: whether the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft could continue operating safely over the Soviet Union and the urgent need to gather photographic intelligence about Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles. Tests conducted at Eglin Air Force Base placed U-2 aircraft against F-102 and F-106 interceptors to determine whether advanced fighters could successfully attack aircraft flying at extreme altitude.

The tests produced troubling results. Although pilots had difficulty visually locating the U-2 at approximately 60,000 feet, the F-102 successfully completed simulated attacks when radar information guided it to the target. The report concludes that successful interception by Soviet fighters was possible and warns that Soviet development of improved air-to-air missiles could make the U-2 increasingly vulnerable. Nevertheless, the CIA believed successful interception by Soviet defensive fighters was unlikely during the following few months.

Other documents explain why officials considered continued reconnaissance worth the growing risk. American intelligence lacked reliable information about the location, production, and deployment of Soviet ICBMs. Particular attention centered on Tyura Tam and the Polyarnyy Ural region, where analysts suspected Soviet missile testing or deployment activity. The reports argue that photographic reconnaissance could reveal launch facilities, rail networks, missile-support installations, and other evidence needed to evaluate Soviet capabilities.

The accompanying maps on pages 7, 10, and 13 illustrate proposed reconnaissance coverage around Tyura Tam and the Ural rail network, visually demonstrating the enormous areas American intelligence hoped to examine for evidence of Soviet missile activity.

The documents provide an important look at the risk-versus-intelligence calculation behind continued U-2 flights over the Soviet Union. Just over a year later, those concerns became reality when Francis Gary Powers’s U-2 was shot down on May 1, 1960.